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Abstract
In many markets, heterogenous agents make non-contractible investments before bar-
gaining over both who matches with whom and the terms of trade. In static markets, the
holdup problem—that is, inefficient investments caused by agents receiving only a fraction
of their returns—is ubiquitous. Markets are often dynamic, however, with agents enter-
ing over time. Taking a general non-cooperative investment and bargaining approach,
we show that the holdup problem vanishes in markets with dynamic entry as agents
become patient: While there is substantial wiggle room for bargaining to determine out-
comes, every bargaining outcome gives everyone her marginal product.
1 Introduction
Crucial investments are often sunk by the time agents bargain over prices and allocations.
For example, workers and employers invest in human and physical capital well before bar-
gaining over who will match with whom and for what wages. This can lead to holdup
problems—that is, agents underinvesting because they do not expect to fully appropriate
the returns from their investments (e.g., Williamson 1975; Grout 1984; Grossman and Hart
1986; Tirole 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) and severely limit the efficiency of these markets
(e.g., Hosios 1990; Acemoglu 1996, 1997; Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001a; de Meza and
Lockwood 2010; Elliott 2015; Felli and Roberts 2016).
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The objective of this paper is to investigate the extent to which holdup is a problem in
matching markets featuring dynamic entry. While the holdup problem in static markets has
been extensively studied, relatively little attention has been given to markets with dynamic
entry. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the
holdup problem in thin markets with dynamic entry.
We model matching markets using a general non-cooperative investment and bargaining
game with stochastic inflows and outflows of agents: Before entering the market, different
types of agents have access to different non-contractible investments. The investments they
make are sunk by the time they enter the market, and they shape their matching surpluses.
Agents in the market bargain according to a standard protocol in the spirit of Rubinstein
(1982): In each period, one agent is randomly selected to be the proposer. The proposer
chooses whom to make an offer to as well as how to split the resulting surplus. The agent
receiving the offer then decides whether to accept it, in which case she matches with the
proposer, and both leave the market; or reject it, in which case no match occurs in this period.
We characterize the type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria of this game for all suffi-
ciently high discount factors, and we show that—in the limit as agents become patient—the
payoffs of a given agent’s potential trade partners are unaffected by that agent’s presence.
In other words, each agent obtains her marginal product independently of her investments,
so there is no holdup problem.
This result is in stark contrast with the fact that, in static matching markets, it is usually
impossible for everyone to obtain her marginal product. For example, consider a market
with n buyers and n sellers. Each buyer can only match with one seller, and vice versa.
Assume for simplicity that everyone matches. When the economy is static, each agent’s
marginal product is the full surplus of one match, so the sum of all agents’ marginal products
is twice the total surplus. In other words, it is far from possible to give everyone their
marginal product—independently of the size n of the market. Indeed, in the context of the
assignment game, Leonard (1983) shows that an agent obtains her marginal product if and
only if she receives her highest possible payoff among all Walrasian equilibria. Hence, full
appropriation only occurs when there is a unique Walrasian equilibrium that pins down all
prices—a situation that, as shown by Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999), is not generic in
finite markets.
A tempting but incorrect intuition for our result is that the combination of dynamic entry
and patience makes the market effectively thick, pinning down the price that must obtain in
a Walrasian equilibrium thereby allowing all agents to simultaneously receive their marginal
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product. Indeed, as in the standard models of bargaining in stationary markets (e.g., Rubin-
stein and Wolinsky 1985), in our setting there is ample wiggle room for bargaining to play
a meaningful role in determining outcomes—even in the limit as agents become impatient.
Despite equilibrium prices varying with agents’ bargaining power (their proposer proba-
bilities), we show that every bargaining outcome gives everyone her marginal product as
agents become patient.
To build intuition for our result, consider an agent who invests differently from all her
fellow agents of the same type. On the one hand, she is in a strong bargaining position
against agents with whom she generates more surplus than her fellows: She can play these
agents off to make sure that she appropriates the additional potential gains generated by her
investment deviation. On the other hand, she is in a weak bargaining position against the
agents with whom she generates less surplus than her fellows: These other agents can effec-
tively ignore her with minimal payoff consequences, so if she ends up in such a match she
has to appropriate these potential losses too. Hence, even while engaging in decentralized
non-cooperative bargaining in a market that may appear thin at every point in time—and
where bargaining dynamics shape the different types’ payoffs in non-trivial ways—every
individual is a price taker, and hence a residual claimant of the surplus created or lost by
any unilateral investment deviation.
Our results show that the sources of holdup in dynamic economies can be qualitatively
different from those in static economies. This has important practical implications. For ex-
ample, Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) document how US labor market fluidity—as measured
by flows of jobs and workers across employers—has fallen over the last few decades, and
they argue that this has significantly reduced productivity.1 Our findings suggest an invest-
ment channel by which lower market fluidity slows matching rates thereby exacerbating
holdup problems, which can lead to less investment and hence lower productivity.
Related literature
The literature investigating the efficiency of investments under competitive matching (e.g.,
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001b; Peters and Siow 2002; Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuel-
son 2013 and 2017; Nöldeke and Samuelson 2015; Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss 2017; Chi-
appori, Dias, and Meghir 2018; Dizdar 2018) focuses on markets featuring a continuum of
price-taking agents on each side to turn off the holdup problem and investigate other sources
of investment inefficiencies—like coordination failures, participation constraints, and imper-
1See also Molloy et al. (2016) and Decker et al. (2018), for example.
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fect information. Our results provide non-cooperative foundations in finite markets for this
widely used price-taking assumption, and shows that dynamic entry can be an important
force behind price-taking behavior.
A branch of the search and matching literature also investigates investment incentives un-
der competitive matching. For example, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that holdup is
not a problem in directed search environments where firms form submarkets by committing
to a posted wage. Relatedly, Bester (2013) shows that holdup need not be a problem in the
steady state equilibrium of a bilateral matching market with a continuum of identical agents
on each side. In contrast, in this paper we take a non-cooperative bargaining approach to
study (not-necessarily-two-sided) markets with arbitrarily many different types of agents,
and we show that holdup need not be a problem even when there are very few agents in the
market at every point in time (on and off the equilibrium path).
In the case of finite markets (with unidimensional attributes and complementarities in
these attributes), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a) provide a condition called “dou-
bly overlapping attributes” that guarantees that there is an essentially unique Walrasian
equilibrium, and that the associated prices continue to clear the market after any unilateral
investment deviation. Under these conditions, agents are price takers—in the sense that
no unilateral change in attributes affects the market prices—and, as a result, efficient non-
contractible investments can be supported in equilibrium. We take a dynamic approach to
address similar questions, and we find that essentially no restrictions on the nature of the
investments and resulting matching surpluses are required to preclude holdup problems
when agents are sufficiently patient. This is because our result does not rely on Walrasian
equilibrium pinning down outcomes uniquely.
Finally, it has been well-known at least since the work of Rogerson (1992) and Makowski
and Ostroy (1995) that efficiency requires agents appropriating their marginal products. Nat-
urally, full appropriation also plays a central role in mechanism design (e.g., Bergemann and
Välimäki 2002; Hatfield et al. 2019). In this paper, we show that full appropriation is endoge-
nously satisfied in our general non-cooperative bargaining game when agents are patient.
Roadmap
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we illustrate the main ideas
in the context of a simple example. In section 3, we describe the general model and, in
section 4, we present and prove our main result. We relegate some details of the analysis
in section 2 to Appendix A, and relatively standard results that we use to prove our main
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result to Appendix B and Appendix C.
2 Example
We start, in subsection 2.1, by reviewing the standard holdup problem in the context of an
investment and bargaining game featuring two buyers and two sellers.2 Then, in subsec-
tion 2.2, we describe a homologous market with sequential entry, and we illustrate how, in
this case, there is no holdup problem. For simplicity, in the version of this example featuring
sequential entry, we assume that each agent that leaves the market is immediately replaced
by a replica.3
Later on, we show the analogous no holdup result in a more general setting that allows (i)
stochastic entry (a relaxation of the replica assumption), (ii) arbitrarily many types of agents,
and (iii) a rich investment technology that allows for general and type-specific investments.
2.1 Holdup in a market without sequential entry
Let us start by describing a simple non-cooperative game featuring a standard holdup prob-
lem. There are two identical buyers, b1 and b2, and two identical sellers, s1 and s2, with a
common discount factor δ. In the first period t = 0, they simultaneously make investments.
They can choose either to invest or to not invest. Their investments shape their matching
surpluses: When a buyer and a seller match in any period t = 1, 2, . . . , they generate
2 units of surplus if both have invested,
1 unit of surplus if only one of them has invested, and
0 units of surplus if none of them has invested.
(1)
Not investing costs zero, and investing costs c, with 1/2 < c < 1. Hence, efficiency requires
that everyone invests if the discount factor δ is sufficiently close to 1.
We focus on the case in which investments at time 0 are not contractible. This requires
specifying how the outcome (that is, who matches with whom and how the resulting surplus
is shared) is determined as a function of the realized investments. We take a non-cooperative
2Holdup is generally also a problem in larger static markets and in unbalanced markets (e.g., Gretsky,
Ostroy, and Zame 1999 and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001a)
3Our general model relaxes this assumption, which has been widely used in the dynamic matching and
bargaining literature; see for example Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Manea (2011), Nguyen (2015), Polanski
and Vega-Redondo (2018) and Talamàs (2019b).
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approach: Once the agents have sunk their investments, they bargain according to the fol-
lowing standard protocol (e.g., Elliott and Nava 2019).
In each period t = 1, 2, . . . , one of the four agents is selected at random to be the proposer:
Each buyer has a probability β
2
of being selected, and each seller has a probability 1−β
2
of
being selected, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 reflects the relative bargaining power of buyers. If the
selected agent has already matched in a previous period, no trade occurs in this period.
Otherwise, the proposer chooses one agent on the other side of the market, and makes her a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to share their gains from trade. The receiver of this offer then either
accepts it, in which case the pair match with the agreed shares; or rejects it, in which case no
trade occurs in this period.
This game features a standard holdup problem: Each agent pays the full costs of her invest-
ment at time t = 0, but does not fully appropriate the resulting increase in surplus in the
matching stage, limiting her incentives to invest efficiently. Indeed, focusing on (Markov)
strategies that only condition on the surpluses that the agents that are yet to match can
generate, we now argue that there does not exist any Markov-perfect equilibrium featuring
efficient investments. For brevity, we consider the case β = 1/2, and we focus on the case in
which agents are arbitrarily patient.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that an efficient equilibrium exists. Given that the ag-
gregate surplus is bounded above by 4, at least one of the agents has a limit gross payoff that
is bounded above by 1. Suppose without loss of generality that the limit gross equilibrium
payoff of b1 is bounded above by 1. Consider a deviation by b1 to not invest. We show that
b1’s limit gross payoff under this deviation is bounded below by 1/2—i.e., this deviation
reduces her limit gross payoff by at most half of the corresponding reduction in gross aggre-
gate surplus. Since this deviation involves no investment costs, b1’s limit net payoff under
this deviation is also bounded below by 1/2, which is strictly higher than 1 − c (the upper
bound on her limit equilibrium net payoff). Hence, this deviation is profitable.
The key observation driving the argument is that, when everyone but b1 invests, b2 does
not delay in equilibrium.4 Hence, b1 can just wait until b2 matches, and then share the re-
maining unit of surplus approximately equally with the remaining seller—as specified by
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium at that point. As a result, her payoff is bounded
below by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1. Intuitively, the deviator can hold out until her
competitor leaves, at which point she faces a bilateral monopoly situation—where the sur-
4While the fact that b2 does not delay in equilibrium seems intuitive enough (it is difficult to imagine how
her bargaining position can improve after b1 leaves), proving this formally requires some care. We relegate the
details of the argument to subsection A.1 in Appendix A.
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plus loss generated by her deviation is shared with another agent, while she pockets all the
associated savings.
2.2 No holdup in a market with sequential entry
Now consider a homologous market featuring sequential entry. In the first period t = 0, a
continuum of identical buyers and a continuum of identical sellers simultaneously make
non-contractible investments. As before, they can choose either to invest or to not invest, and
their investments determine the surplus of each match—as specified by (1). Each agent that
invests has to pay the investment cost c in the period in which she enters the market. As in
the market without sequential entry, when agents are sufficiently patient, efficiency requires
that everyone invests.
Once the agents have sunk their investments, they bargain according to the following
standard protocol (e.g., Talamàs 2019b): In each period t = 1, 2, . . . , there are two active
buyers and two active sellers. In particular, in the first period t = 1, two buyers and two
sellers are selected uniformly at random to be active and, every time a buyer and a seller
trade, they leave the market, and a new buyer-seller pair is drawn uniformly at random
(from those that are yet to become active) to replace them. The agents in the market bargain
exactly as in the case without sequential entry described above. Hence, in each period, both
the bargaining protocol and the matching surpluses are exactly as in a subgame that starts
in period t = 1 of the game without sequential entry described above.
We argue that, in stark contrast to the setting without sequential entry, holdup is not a
problem in this game when agents are patient. To illustrate this as simply as possible, we
first consider the case of equal bargaining powers (β = 1/2). Focusing on Markov strategies
that condition only on the profile of investments made at t = 0 and the investments of the
active agents, we show that there exists an efficient Markov-perfect equilibrium (in which
everyone invests).5
In Appendix B, we show that there exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the subgame
that starts at t = 1 for any profile of investments made in period t = 0. Hence, in order
to show that there exists an efficient Markov-perfect equilibrium, it is enough to describe
Markov-perfect equilibria of the subgames that start with (i) everyone that is yet to enter the
market having invested and (ii) all but one of the active agents having invested; and to show
that any unilateral investment deviation from a strategy profile in which everyone invests
5Furthermore, when agents are arbitrarily patient, every type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium is
efficient (see subsection A.2 in Appendix A).
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and that is consistent with these equilibria is unprofitable.
Let us start by considering the case of equal bargaining powers (β = 1/2). First, let us
describe Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies for the subgames where everyone that is yet
to trade (active or inactive) has invested: Each agent accepts every offer that gives her at
least w, and each proposer offers w to an agent on the other side of the market, who accepts.












 , or, equivalently, w = δ
2− δ
.(2)
Second, let us describe Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies for every subgame in which
all but one agent, who is active, has invested. As soon as the deviator leaves, switch to the
strategy just described. While the deviator is active: Each non-deviator (i) offers w (defined
by Equation 2) to some other non-deviator, who accepts with probability one, and (ii) accepts
an offer if and only if it gives her at least w. The deviator (i) offers w to some non-deviator,
who accepts with probability one, and (ii) accepts an offer if and only if it gives her at least




(1− w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
















= w − δ
4− 3δ
.(3)
Hence, this is indeed an equilibrium, since Equation 3 implies that 2 − w > 1 − w′, which
implies, in turn, that the best that the non-deviators can do is to obtain 2− w when they are
the proposers. We conclude that the deviator saves c in the period before she enters, but has





4−3δ . Hence, her deviation is not profitable when δ ≥ δ̄,





The key behind the argument above is that, when everyone invests, the price that a devia-
tor has to pay in order to match with an agent on the other side of the market is not affected
by her deviation. As a result, each agent faces the full negative consequences of her own
deviation. This conclusion does not depend on the buyers’ relative bargaining power β. In
general, the limit gross equilibrium payoffs when everyone invests are 2β for buyers, and
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2(1 − β) for sellers, and, just as above, a unilateral investment deviation does not affect the
non-deviators’ payoffs. In other words, while different relative bargaining powers shape the
limit equilibrium payoffs, they do not affect the fact that agents face the full consequences
of their individual investment decisions.
3 Model
There is a finite set I of types of agents, and a continuum of agents of each type. The type
of an agent determines her investment opportunities and her resulting gains from trade,
as specified below. All the agents have a common discount factor 0 ≤ δ < 1, common
knowledge of the game and perfect information about all the events preceding any of their
decision nodes in the game.
3.1 Investment
In the first period t = 0, all the agents simultaneously choose their investments: Each agent
of type i chooses an investment from a finite set Ki ⊂ Rmi , where mi ≥ 1. An agent of type
i with investment profile xi and an agent of type j 6= i with investment profile xj produce
y(xi, xj) > 0 units of surplus when they match, and the costs of their investments are c(xi)
and c(xj), respectively. An agent of type i with investment profile xi generates y(xi, xi) > 0
in isolation (this can capture her exogenous outside options, for example). Each agent pays
her investment cost in the period in which she enters the market.
Remark 3.1. Given that the function y determines the surplus of each match only as a function of
the investment profiles of its members, this formulation encodes all the heterogeneities among types
via their investment opportunities. This can capture arbitrary heterogeneity among different types of
agents. For example, suppose that there are two seller types, i′ and i′′, and two buyer types, j′ and
j′′, and further that i′ is a much better fit for type j′ than j′′ is, while i′′ is a much better fit for type
j′′ than j′ is. To capture this situation, we can simply take the surplus y(xi, xj) associated with any
investment profile (xi, xj) ∈ (Ki′×Kj′)∪(Ki′′×Kj′′) to be high relative to the associated investment
costs, and the surplus y(xi, xj) associated with any investment profile (xi, xj) ∈ (Ki′′×Kj′)∪(Ki′×
Kj′′) to be low relative to the associated investment costs.
Remark 3.2. We assume that all investments are decided before any bargaining occurs for two rea-
sons. First, this highlights that our mechanism does not rely on intertwining the investment and
bargaining stages (as is the case in Che and Sákovics 2004, for example). Second, this substantially
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simplifies the analysis by allowing us to leverage existing results in the non-cooperative bargaining
literature (e.g., Elliott and Nava 2019 and Talamàs 2019b).
3.2 Non-cooperative bargaining
Once everyone chooses her investment in period t = 0, bargaining occurs in discrete periods
t = 1, 2, . . . . For each type i, there are ni ≥ 2 bargaining slots. In any given period, each slot of
a given type can be occupied by one agent of that type, or be empty. We refer to the agents
occupying the slots in any given period as the active agents in that period, and we denote the




In each period t = 1, 2, . . . , one slot is selected uniformly at random (i.e., each slot is
selected with probability 1/n). If the slot is empty, no trade occurs in this period. Otherwise,
its occupant becomes the proposer. The proposer a chooses an active agent b (which can be
herself) and makes her a take-it-or-leave-it offer specifying a split of the surplus y(xa, xb),
where xa and xb denote agents a and b’s investment profiles, respectively. The receiver of
this offer can then accept or reject. If she accepts, then a and b exit the market with the
agreed shares, vacating their respective bargaining slots. Otherwise no trade occurs (and no
bargaining slots are vacated) in this period.
3.3 Stochastic entry
For each type i and each s ≤ ni, at the beginning of each period that starts with s empty
bargaining slots of type i, a number s′ ≤ s is drawn according to a stationary probability
distribution qis. Then, s′ agents are drawn uniformly at random from those agents of type i
that are yet to become active, and these are randomly assigned to different empty slots of
type i. We restrict attention to markets that never become extremely small, in the following
sense.
Assumption 3.3. There are always at least two active agents of each type.
Assuming that there is always at least one active agent of each type simplifies the analysis
by guaranteeing that, when all the agents of the same type choose the same investments,
payoffs are uniquely determined by our notion of Markov-perfect equilibrium (Proposi-
tion C.2). Assuming that there are always at least two active agents of each type further
6Assuming the existence of such bargaining slots is a useful modelling device. This assumption need not
be interpreted literally.
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simplifies the analysis by guaranteeing that a deviating agent can directly play off the agents
of other types, and that no unilateral investment deviation shrinks the relevant bargaining
opportunities of the non-deviators.
Remark 3.4. Assumption 3.3 holds under fairly mild conditions on the stochastic inflow process. It
holds, for example, if there is at least one active agent of each type in period t = 1, and qini−1(0) = 0
for each type i. It also holds under the classical replica framework of the literature on non-cooperative
bargaining in stationary markets (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1985 and 1990; Gale 1987; de Fraja
and Sákovics 2001, Manea 2011, Lauermann 2013, Nguyen 2015, Polanski and Vega-Redondo 2018,
Talamàs 2019b) as long as there are two or more agents of each type.
3.4 Histories, strategies and equilibrium
There are three kinds of histories. We denote by ht a history of the game up to—but not
including—time t. We denote by (ht; i) the history that consists of ht followed by agent i
being selected to be the proposer at time t. We denote by (ht; i → j; s) the history that
consists of (ht; i) followed by agent i offering a share s to agent j. A strategy σi for agent i
specifies her investment and, for all possible histories ht, the offer σi(ht; i) that she makes
following the history (ht; i) and her response σi(ht; j → i; s).
The strategy profile σ is a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium if it induces a Nash
equilibrium in every subgame, all the agents of any given type follow the same strategy, and
each agent a’s bargaining strategy conditions only on (i) the investment profile, (ii) the set
{y(xb, xc) | agents b, c active} of surpluses among the active agents, (iii) the set {y(xa, xb) |
agent b active} of surpluses that she can create with the active agents, (iv) for each type i
that is such that not all agents of type i yet to enter have chosen the same investment, the
number of vacant slots of type i, and (v) the going proposal (in the case of a response).7
4 No holdup in equilibrium
Theorem 4.1 below shows that an investment profile (xi)i∈I can be implemented as a type-
symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium for all sufficiently high discount factors if and only
if it is constrained efficient—in the sense that no agent, taking others’ payoffs as given and free
to choose whom to match with, has a profitable investment deviation. In particular, in every
7The number of vacant slots of type i is payoff relevant only when not all agents of type i yet to enter have
chosen the same investment.
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type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, agents become price takers as they become
arbitrarily patient, and hence they appropriate the full returns of their investments.
As background for this result, note that, for each type-symmetric investment profile x :=
(xi)i∈I and each type i, there exists Vi(x) > 0 such that, in every subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the subgame that starts at t = 1 with the investment profile x, Vi(x) is the expected equilib-
rium (gross) payoff at the beginning of each period of each agent of type i (Proposition C.2).
We denote the limit of Vi(x) as δ goes to 1 by V ?i (x).8
Theorem 4.1. A type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium with investment profile x := (xi)i∈I













for each i in I.(4)
Proof. Necessity: Fix a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium σ with investment profile
(xi)i∈I . Let vi and wi denote the (gross) expected equilibrium payoff of each active agent of
type i in a period in which she is and she is not the proposer, respectively. Given that σ is
Markov perfect, each agent gets—when she is the proposer—the maximum amount that she
can obtain while leaving the receiver indifferent between accepting and rejecting (unless she








Given that each agent is selected to be the proposer with probability 1/n and that, in equi-




















→ 1 as δ → 1.
Hence, it is enough to show that, for any investment deviation from the equilibrium σ by an
agent d, and for any agent a 6= d (of type i, say), a’s expected equilibrium payoff ŵa when
rejecting an offer from d gets arbitrarily close to wi as δ goes to 1. Indeed, given that the set
of investments is finite, and that wi converges to V ?i (x) for each type i, when δ is sufficiently





[y(za, xj)− V ?j (x)]
)
− c(za).
8Talamàs (2019a) describes a simple algorithm that computes the profile V ?(x) for every investment profile
x := (xi)i∈I , and characterizes V ?(x) in terms of the the classical Nash bargaining solution.
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Suppose that an agent d of type k deviates from σ by investing xd 6= xk. Assumption 3.3
ensures that the Markov state does not change while the deviator d is active.9 Hence, given
that σ is Markov perfect, for each agent a we can let ŵa be her expected equilibrium payoff
when rejecting an offer while d is active. Furthermore, when d is the proposer, she offers ŵa
to some agent a, who accepts with probability one.10
Fix an arbitrary type i, and let a 6= d be an agent of type i such that there exists an agent c 6=
a with whom the deviator trades with positive probability in equilibrium (Assumption 3.3
ensures that we can find such an agent). We argue that ŵa −wi converges to 0 as δ goes to 1.
Since σ is type symmetric, this implies that, for each agent b of type i, ŵb−wi also converges
to 0 in the limit as δ goes to 1.
Let ε > 0. First, note that ŵa ≥ wi − ε for all sufficiently high discount factors. This
is because agent a can always wait for the deviator to leave, and—once this happens—her
expected equilibrium payoff (when rejecting an offer) is wi. We now argue that ŵa ≤ wi + ε
for all sufficiently high discount factors. For contradiction, suppose otherwise. Given that,
as we have just argued, for each type j and each agent b of type j other than the deviator,
ŵb ≥ wj − ε for all sufficiently high discount factors, agent a must be making offers to the
deviator for all sufficiently high discount factors. For each such discount factor δ, letting
π > 0 be the probability that the deviator trades with someone other than a when a is not





(y(xa, xd)− ŵd) +
n− 1
n
(πwi + (1− π)ŵa)
]











If the weak inequality holds with equality, it is easy to check that ŵa gets arbitrarily close
to wi as δ goes to 1, a contradiction. Otherwise, ŵa is strictly smaller than wi for all large
enough δ, also a contradiction.
Sufficiency: Proposition B.1 shows that there exists a type-symmetric Markov perfect equi-
librium in the subgame starting at t = 1 for every choice of agents’ investments. Hence, for
9Indeed, neither the set {y(xa, xb) | agents a, b active} of surpluses among the active agents nor the set
{y(xd, xb) | agent b active} of surpluses that the deviator d can generate with the active agents change while
the deviator d is active.
10Note that agent d deviates at the investment stage only, so σ still governs her bargaining strategy. Given
that σ is Markov, and that the environment is stationary from the point of view of the deviator d, she can obtain
a strictly bigger amount when she is the proposer than when she is the receiver, so she leaves the market—by
matching to herself or to someone else—with probability one when she is the proposer.
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each investment profile z, we can pick an equilibrium σ(z) of the subgame that starts at t = 1.
Given any investment profile (xi)i∈I , define a strategy profile as follows: All the agents of
type i invest xi, and each agent’s bargaining strategy given any investment profile z is as
specified by σ(z). This strategy profile is a Markov-perfect equilibrium if no agent has in-
centives to deviate at the investment stage (t = 0), which—as argued in the necessity part of
the proof—is guaranteed (for all sufficiently high discount factors) by condition (4).
The absence of holdup in equilibrium does not imply that every equilibrium involves ef-
ficient investments, nor that every efficient investment profile can be implemented in equi-
librium. For example, coordination failures can sustain inefficient investment profiles in
equilibrium. To see this, consider the example described in subsection 2.2, with the follow-
ing modification: The surplus of any match is 0 unless both sides invest (in which case this
surplus is 2). It is still efficient that everyone invests (for sufficiently high discount factors),
but there is an (inefficient) equilibrium in which no one invests. Also, while the absence of
holdup guarantees constrained-efficient investments (as defined above), it does not guar-
antee that all efficient investments can be sustained in equilibrium. For instance, in the
example described in subsection 2.2, when buyers’ bargaining power β is small, there is no
equilibrium in which everyone invests, even though efficiency calls for everyone investing
independently of β. Indeed, given that the buyers’ limit (gross) equilibrium payoff when
everyone invests is 2β, when β < c
2
, they do not find it worthwhile to invest.11
5 Conclusion
In the context of a general non-cooperative investment and bargaining game, this paper
shows that dynamic entry can solve the holdup problem—even in markets that are thin at
every point in time. In particular, in stark contrast to the standard conclusion reached under
a static view of markets, we show that everyone simultaneously obtains her marginal prod-
uct as frictions vanish, thus eliminating the holdup problem. This provides non-cooperative
foundations for the standard price taking assumption in matching markets, and shows that
dynamic entry can significantly ameliorate the holdup problem.
As is standard in the literature, bargaining outcomes are sensitive to the bargaining pro-
tocol. But, remarkably, our no holdup result is not. For example, even if different proposer
probabilities affect the different types’ payoffs in the limit as agents become patient, they
11Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a; 2001b) and Nöldeke and Samuelson (2015), for example, investigate
these sources of inefficiency in a competitive matching environment that precludes holdup problems.
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do no affect the fact that every individual obtains her marginal product in this limit. Our
main finding also extends to more general bargaining protocols in which agents have a more
restricted choice of whom to make offers to, or where agents match at random (as in Rubin-
stein and Wolinsky (1985) and most of the subsequent literature).
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Appendices
A Details omitted from section 2
A.1 Details omitted from subsection 2.1
We show formally the key observation from the example in subsection 2.1: When everyone
but b1 invests, b2 does not delay in equilibrium. Towards a contradiction, suppose that, when
b2 is the proposer, she delays (makes an unacceptable proposal) with probability π > 0, she
makes an acceptable offer to s1 with probability (1− π)β, and she makes an acceptable offer
to s2 with probability (1− π)(1− β).
First note that, since b2 delays, neither the sellers nor the other buyer b1 can delay. To see
this, let wi denote i’s expected equilibrium gross payoff in any given period (before anyone
has matched) conditional on not trading in this period. It follows from min{wb2 + ws1 , wb2 +
ws2} ≥ 2 (which holds because b2 delays) and wb1 +ws2 +wb2 +ws1 < 3 (which holds because
the aggregate discounted surplus is below 3) that wb1 +ws1 < 1 and wb1 +ws2 < 1. Hence, in
equilibrium, b1 makes an acceptable offer with probability one to either s1 or s2 when she is
the proposer. Moreover, by the same argument, the sellers both make acceptable offers to b1
with probability one when they are the proposers.
Second, letting w be the amount that a seller that is yet to match is indifferent between
accepting and rejecting in a subgame in which b1 has already matched, the fact that b2 delays

































where κ denotes the probability that b1 makes an offer to s1 in any period before anyone has
matched when b1 is the proposer, and w′ is the quantity that a seller that is yet to match is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting in a subgame in which b2 has already matched.
Given that 2 − w ≥ 1 ≥ 1 − wb1 , that w′ < w, and that ws1 = ws2 unless β = 1 (because
b2 makes offers only to a seller with the lowest cutoff), the combination of Equation 5 and
Equation 6 implies that ws1 ≤ w, a contradiction.
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A.2 Details omitted from subsection 2.2
We show that—for all sufficiently high discount factors—every type-symmetric Markov-
perfect equilibrium of the game described in subsection 2.2 is efficient. Suppose for con-
tradiction that there exists a sequence D of discount factors converging to 1, such that, for
each δ ∈ D, there exists a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium σ in which only the
sellers invest. We show that, for all sufficiently high δ ∈ D, a buyer can profitably deviate by
investing. A similar argument shows that—when agents are arbitrarily patient—there exists
no type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in which only the buyers invest, or in which
neither the buyers nor the sellers invest.
Let δ ∈ D and consider the associated equilibrium σ. On the equilibrium path, each
















Suppose that buyer b′1 deviates and invests, and consider a subgame in which b′1 is active.
From the point of view of b′1, the environment is stationary. Hence, when she is the proposer,
she makes offers that leave the receiver indifferent between accepting and rejecting, and
which are accepted with probability one.12
Let s be a seller such that there exists a seller s′ 6= s with whom the deviator trades with
positive probability, and let ŵs be her expected equilibrium payoff when rejecting an offer
from b′1. We show that, in the limit as δ goes to 1, ŵs converges to 1/2. Given that σ is Markov
perfect and specifies that each agent of the same type follows the same strategy, this implies
that every other seller’s expected equilibrium payoff when rejecting an offer from b′1 also
converges to 1/2, so when δ is sufficiently high this deviation is profitable (the deviator’s net
gain is 1− c > 0).
First, we argue that ŵs is bounded below by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1. Given that the
seller s can always wait for the deviator to leave (at which point she obtains 1/2), for each
ε > 0, ŵs is bounded below by 1/2− ε for all high enough δ ∈ D. A similar argument shows
that the expected equilibrium payoff ŵb of each buyer b 6= b′1 conditional on not being the
proposer in a period in which b′1 is active is bounded below by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1.
Second, we argue that ŵs is bounded above by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1. Suppose for
contradiction that there exists ε > 0 such that ŵs ≥ 1/2 + ε for all sufficiently high δ ∈ D.
12Note that we are considering an investment deviation from σ, so the Markov-perfect equilibrium σ still
governs the deviator’s bargaining strategy.
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Given that, as we have just argued, for each buyer b 6= b′1, ŵb is bounded below by 1/2 in
the limit as δ goes to 1, seller s must be making offers to the deviator b′1 for all sufficiently
high δ ∈ D. For each such discount factor δ, letting π > 0 be the probability that the deviator








(πw + (1− π)ŵs)
]










which implies that ŵs converges to 1/2 as δ goes to 1, a contradiction.
B Existence of a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium
Proposition B.1 below is analogous to the Markov-perfect equilibrium existence proof in
Elliott and Nava (2019).
Proposition B.1. For every investment profile x, there exists a strategy profile that is a type-
symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting in period t = 1 with investment
profile x.
Proof. Let the kind of an agent be determined by her type and her investment profile. With-
out loss of generality, we can assume that the investment sets {Ki}i∈I do not overlap, so we
can identify the set of agent kinds by K := ∪i∈IKi, which is finite because each Ki is itself fi-
nite. Letm denote the number of elements ofK. We abuse terminology by referring to i ∈ K
as “agent i.” Let K be the finite set of all possible profiles of agents that can be active in the
market at any given time. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the subgame
that starts at t = 1 with any given investment profile, and then use it to show that such an
equilibrium exists.
Consider a Markov-perfect-equilibrium strategy profile and its corresponding value func-
tion V : K → Rm, where V (K) gives each agent’s expected equilibrium payoff in any period
at the beginning of a period that starts with active agent set K (before any agents become
active this period). Consider a subgame with active agent set K ∈ K, and let sij denote the
surplus that agents i and j generate when they match in this subgame. By Markov perfec-
tion, agent j accepts any offer that gives her strictly more than δVj(K), and rejects any offer
that gives her strictly less than δVj(K). This implies that no one offers more than δVj(K)
to any agent j. Therefore, a proposer i makes offers with positive probability only to j that
maximizes her net payoff sij − δVj(K). Hence, when i ∈ K is the proposer, the expected
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where πij denotes the probability that i and j agree to trade. When i is the proposer, if there
exists j ∈ K such that δ(Vi(K) + Vj(K)) < sij , then she makes offers only to j ∈ K for
which sij − δVj(K) is maximum, and agreement obtains with probability one. Otherwise,
she delays—in the sense that she makes offers that are not accepted in equilibrium. We
denote the probability that i ∈ K delays by πii. Thus, any agreement probability profile
πi(K) ∈ ∆(K)—corresponding to the histories in which i is the proposer—that is consistent




πii = 0 if δVi < max
j∈K\{i}
{sij − δVj(K)},




For any value function V , any K ∈ K and any agent i ∈ K, define f i,K(V ) : K → Rm by
f i,Ki (V ) = πiiδVi(K) + (1− πii) maxj∈K\{i}{sij − δVj(K)}
f i,Kk (V ) = (πii + πik)δVk(K) +
∑
j∈K\{i,k}
πijδVk(K\{i, j}) ∀k 6= i,
for any πi ∈ Πi,K(V ). That is, f i,Ki (V ) gives the set of expected payoffs that are consistent
with the value function V in any history in which active agent set is K and the proposer is
agent i. Letting V denote the set of value functions V : K → Rm, consider the correspondence
F : V → V defined by





f i,K(V ), for all value functions V and all K ∈ K.(8)
The value function V corresponds to a Markov-perfect equilibrium payoff profile if and
only if V ∈ F (V ). So it is enough to show that the correspondence F has a fixed point. This
follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (Kakutani 1941). Indeed, the domain V of F is
a non-empty, compact and convex subset of an Euclidean space. Moreover, since, for any
K ∈ K and any i ∈ K, the correspondence Πi,K is upper-hemicontinuous with non-empty
convex images, so is the correspondence f i,K , and hence so is F .
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C For online publication: Unique equilibrium payoffs
Proposition C.2 shows that, as long as there is always at least one agent of each type active in
the market, the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium pins down the payoffs of all agents
conditional on their (type-symmetric) investment strategies. Moreover, these payoffs are
independent of the details of the process by which bargaining slots are filled. This is a slight
generalization of the analogous result in Talamàs (2019b), where it is assumed that exactly
one agent of each type is active in the market at each point in time. Proposition C.2 holds
under the following assumption, which is weaker than Assumption 3.3.
Assumption C.1. There is always at least one active agent of each type.
Proposition C.2. Fix an investment profile x := (xi)i∈I , and suppose that Assumption C.1 holds.
For every type i, there exists a value Vi(x) > 0 such that, in every subgame-perfect equilibrium with
investment profile x, the expected equilibrium payoff of each active agent of type i at the beginning of
each period is Vi(x).
The proof of Proposition C.2 is identical to the corresponding result in Talamàs (2019b),
which is itself similar to the proof of the analogous result in Manea (2017) in the context
of a model with random matching (as opposed to the framework with strategic choice of
partners that we focus on in this paper). We provide this proof here for completeness.
Proposition C.2 follows from Proposition C.3, since every subgame-perfect equilibrium
of a game with perfect information (as the one we study) survives the process of iterated
conditional dominance (Theorem 4.3 in Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, page 128), we define iterated conditional domi-
nance on the class of multi-stage games with observed actions as follows.
Definition C.1. Action ati available to some agent i at information set Ht is conditionally dom-
inated if every strategy of agent i that assigns positive probability to action ati in the infor-
mation set Ht is strictly dominated. Iterated conditional dominance is the process that, at each
round, deletes every conditionally-dominated action given the strategies that have survived
all the previous rounds.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) show how iterated conditional dominance solves the alternating-
offers bilateral model of Rubinstein (1982). Manea (2017) shows how iterated conditional
dominance also solves a wide class of models similar to the one considered in this article.
We prove Proposition C.3 using the techniques developed in Manea (2017).
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Proposition C.3. Fix an investment profile (xi)i∈I . For every type i, there exists wi > 0 such that,
in every game in which Assumption C.1 holds, after the process of iterated conditional dominance,
every agent of type i always accepts (rejects) an offer that gives her strictly more (less) than wi.
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. First, we define recursively two sequences (mki )i∈I and
(Mki )i∈I , and show by induction on k that after every step s of iterated conditional dominance
(see below for a formal definition of such a step), each agent of type i always rejects every
offer that gives her strictly less than δmsi and always accepts every offer that gives her strictly
more than δM si . Second, we show that both sequences (mki )i∈I and (Mki )i∈I converge to the
same point (wi)i∈I .
We denote the surplus y(xi, xj) that a buyer of type i and a seller of type j generate when
they match by sij .
(i) Iterated Conditional Dominance Procedure
Let us start by reviewing how the process of iterated conditional dominance works in the
present context. For simplicity, we break up the procedure into steps 0, 1, . . . , with each step
containing three rounds.
Step 0.
Round 0a. Note that a strategy that ever accepts with positive probability a negative share
is strictly dominated by the strategy reject all offers and make only offers that give me a positive
share. These are all the actions that are eliminated in Round 0a. Hence, after this round every
agent of type i always rejects every offer that gives her strictly less than δm0i , where
(9) m0i := 0.
Round 0b. Given the actions that survive round 0a, each agent of type i has an expected payoff
(at the beginning of the period, before the proposer has been chosen) of at most M0i , where
(10) M0i := max
j
{sij}.
because, by assumption, no agent of type j can ever offer any agent of type i a payoff higher
than sij , and, by the actions eliminated in round 0a, no agent ever accepts a negative payoff.
Hence, every strategy κ of an agent of type i that ever rejects with positive probability an
offer a that gives her strictly more than δM0i is strictly dominated by a similar strategy κ′
that specifies accept a with probability π in every instance in which κ specifies reject a with
probability π. These are all the actions that are eliminated in Round 0b; so after this round
every agent of type i always accepts every offer that gives her strictly more than δM0i .
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Round 0c. Given the actions that survive rounds 0a and 0b, every strategy κ of every agent
of type i that ever makes an offer with positive probability that gives y > δM0j to an agent
of type j is strictly dominated by a similar strategy κ′ that specifies offer y − ε > δM0j to
agent j with probability π in every instance in which κ specifies offer y to an agent of type j with
probability π, since every agent of type j must accept both y and y−ε. These are all the actions
that are eliminated in round 0c; after this round no agent ever makes an offer giving y > δM0j to
any agent of type j.
Proceeding inductively, imagine that, after step s = k ∈ Z≥0, we have concluded (as we
have just done for the case s = 0) that every agent of type i:
1. rejects every offer that gives her strictly less than δmsi ,
2. has an expected payoff (at the beginning of each period) of at most M si ,
3. accepts every offer that gives her strictly more than δM si , and
4. does not make offers that give strictly more than δM sj to any agent of type j.
We now show that points (1) to (4) also hold at step s = k + 1.
Step k + 1.
We refer to strategies that assign positive probability only to actions that have survived all
previous rounds of iterated conditional dominance as “surviving strategies.”
Round (k+1)a. Given the surviving strategies, it is conditionally dominated for any agent of
type i to ever accept an offer that gives her a surplus strictly lower than δmk+1i , where m
k+1
i














To see this, consider a period-t subgame where an agent of type i has to respond to an offer
x < δmk+1i . We argue that, for sufficiently small ε > 0, accepting this offer is conditionally
dominated by the following plan of action—which is designed to give her a time-t expected
payoff that approaches δmk+1i as ε goes to 0: Reject all offers received at dates t′ ≥ t. When selected
to be the proposer at time t′, offer δMk+t+1−t
′







i , and make an unacceptable offer otherwise (e.g. offer a negative amount to some agent).
Note that since t′ ≥ t+ 1, we have that k+ t+ 1− t′ ≤ k. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
all agents j accept the offer δMk+t+1−t
′
j + ε at period t
′ ∈ [t+ 1, t+ k+ 1]. Moreover, note that
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(sij − δMkj ) + n−1n δm
k
i otherwise
and an analogous equation can be used to expand the term mki in Equation 12, and then
mk−1i in the resulting equation, and so on until reaching m
0
i = 0. It is clear from the resulting
formula for mk+1i that, under the surviving strategies, the strategy constructed above gener-
ates an expected period-t payoff for i of δmk+1i as ε → 0. Hence, letting ε > 0 be sufficiently
small, this strategy conditionally dominates accepting x in period t. These are the actions
eliminated in round (k+1)a; after this round no agent of type i ever accepts any offer that gives
her a surplus lower than δmk+1i .
Round (k+1)b. Given the surviving strategies, it is conditionally dominated for any agent
of type i to reject an offer that gives her strictly more than δMk+1i , where M
k+1














To prove this, we show that for each agent of type i, all surviving strategies deliver expected
payoffs of at most Mk+1i at the beginning of period t. First, consider a period-t subgame






(sij − δmkj ), δMki
)
.
To see this note that, under the surviving strategies, all agents of type j reject all offers lower
than δmkj , and when an agent of type j rejects an offer, every agent o type i can expect a
period-(t + 1) payoff of at most Mki . Second, consider a period-t subgame where an agent
of type i is not the proposer; under the surviving strategies, this agent can expect a period-t
payoff of at most Mki . Therefore, agent of type i has an expected payoff (at the beginning of each
period) of at most Mk+1i . These are all the actions that are eliminated in round (k+1)b; after
this round, no agent ever offers strictly more than δMk+1j to any agent of type j.
Round (k+1)c. Given the surviving strategies, every strategy κ of agent of type i that ever
makes an offer that gives y > δMk+1j to agent of type j is strictly dominated by a similar
strategy κ′ that specifies offer y − ε > δMk+1j to agent of type j with probability π in every
instance in which κ specifies offer y to agent of type j with probability π, since every agent of
type j must accept both y and y − ε. These are all the actions that are eliminated in round
(k+1)c; after this round no agent ever makes an offer giving y > δMk+1j to any agent of type j.
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(ii) The sequences (mki )i∈N and (Mki )i∈N converge to the same limit.
First, we prove by induction on k that for all i ∈ N , the sequence (mki )k≥0 is increasing in k,
the sequence (Mki )k≥0 is decreasing in k, and max
j∈N
(sij) ≥ Mki ≥ mki ≥ 0 for all k ≥ 0. This
implies that both sequences (mki )i∈N and (Mki )i∈N converge.
Note that m0i = 0 and M0i := max
j
{si,j}, and that Equation 11 and Equation 13 imply that
m1i ≥ 0 and M1i ≤ max
j
{si,j}, so m1i ≥ m0i and M1i ≤M1i . Now suppose that for some l ∈ N:
mli ≥ ml−1i and M li ≤M l−1i .
We show that
ml+1i ≥ mli and M l+1i ≤M li .
Note that, by the induction hypothesis, every summand in Equation 11 when k = l + 1
is smaller than when k = l, which implies that ml+1i ≤ mli. Similarly, every summand in
Equation 13 when k = l + 1 is bigger than when k = l, which implies that M l+1i ≥ M li .












Second, we show that the sequences (mki )i∈N and (Mki )i∈N converge to the same limit. Let
Dk be max
i∈N




































































































where j′ in the first inequality is any element of argmax
j∈N
(si,j − δMkj ), and the second inequality is a
consequence of Lemma C.4 below.
Lemma C.4 (Manea 2017). For all w1, w2, w3, w4 ∈ R,
|max(w1, w2)−max(w3, w4)| ≤ max(|w1 − w3|, |w2 − w4|).
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